U.S. Targets African Copper And Cobalt With Offtake Deals To Counter China’s Grip

The world’s copper-and-cobalt story is not only about geology. It is about who controls the “pipes” that move metal from the ground to the factory.

Start with concentration. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the anchor. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated that Congo accounted for about 76% of world cobalt mine production in 2024. That means any buyer who wants “secure” cobalt supply eventually runs into the same problem: most roads lead through the DRC.

Now add the harder part: processing and routing. Even when ore is dug in Africa, the metal often gets refined and “made usable” elsewhere. China’s advantage has been less about owning every mine and more about building long-term buying relationships, processing capacity, and logistics that funnel raw material into Chinese-centered supply chains.

That is why the February 9 story matters. The U.S. effort is trying to change who gets first claim on African output—not by planting flags on mines, but by shaping contracts and trade routes.

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An offtake agreement is simple in concept: a buyer gets the right to purchase a set amount of production, often for years, under agreed terms. In practice, offtake does two big things:

Reuters’ reporting frames the U.S. playbook as “finance + offtake” rather than “own the mine.” That approach is not romantic, but it is realistic. Running mines in the DRC can be politically and operationally complex, and U.S.-linked groups often prefer to reduce direct exposure while still securing material.

Recent reporting around Gécamines shows what “commercial control” looks like in the real world. A Mercuria statement dated January 12, 2026 said Gécamines planned to export 100,000 tonnes of copper to the United States, supported by Mercuria. Separate market reporting described the arrangement as a joint venture structure that helps Gécamines sell copper tied to production at major projects where it holds stakes. 

The important point for investors is not the headline tonnage by itself. It is the mechanism: marketing rights and trader partnerships can redirect material flows without changing mine ownership. That is “market plumbing.”

The second piece is corridors. The Lobito Corridor is often described as a way to move minerals westward—from the Copperbelt in the DRC and Zambia through Angola to the Atlantic—rather than routing everything east or into older patterns.

The Istituto Affari Internazionali described the corridor as a 1,300-kilometer rail link connecting the Copperbelt to the Port of Lobito in Angola. This is not just infrastructure. It is a strategy to make it easier for “Atlantic-facing” buyers to access copper and cobalt with fewer bottlenecks.

But corridor stories come with credibility tests. A December 4, 2025 Guardian report summarized warnings from Global Witness that as many as 6,500 people could face displacement risks tied to Lobito Corridor developments near Kolwezi, with concerns about compensation and resettlement planning. If the corridor becomes a flagship project, the social license piece is not optional. It is part of the cost structure.

This week’s offtake push also sits on top of a broader policy effort. The U.S. State Department said that at the Critical Minerals Ministerial on February 4, 2026, the United States signed 11 bilateral critical minerals frameworks and MOUs in a single day.

MOUs do not move metal by themselves. But they can reduce friction for financing, align standards, and signal political backing—things that matter when projects take years and cross multiple jurisdictions.

With the headline in mind, the key is to focus on the few signals that reveal whether supply control is actually shifting.

“New partnerships” without financing and shipping details are often just signaling. Real shifts show up when shipments are booked, insurance is obtained, and buyers commit to multi-year liftings.

Indicators Worth Watching

The February 9, 2026 story is a reminder that critical minerals competition is often won in the unglamorous parts of the system: contracts, financing, logistics, and routing. Mines matter, but the bigger fight is about who controls the steady flow of copper and cobalt from Central Africa into the world’s refineries and factories.